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INSURANCE COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN MONTANA
Scott H. Stanaway
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases the Montana Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether a liability insurance policy may cover pu-
nitive damages assessed against an insured.1 Holding in favor of
coverage in both cases, the court answered the question on con-
tract interpretation and public policy grounds. This comment dis-
cusses these cases and their implications for Montana. In addition,
this comment analyzes the concept of punitive damages and the
theories courts use in determining whether insurance policies cover
punitive damages.
II. THE CONCEPT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: GENERALLY AND IN
MONTANA
Punitive or exemplary damages are a class of money damages
awarded to punish and deter a tortfeasor and others from similar
tortious conduct.2 Virtually all jurisdictions in the United States
allow an award of punitive damages over and above compensatory
damages. Only four state courts have found punishment not proper
for civil counts and, therefore, do not permit punitive damages ex-
cept when explicitly allowed by statute.3 Three state courts have
held that punitive damages are actually compensatory in nature
and limit them accordingly." Furthermore, some courts disallow
punitive damages if a criminal sanction could be imposed for the
same conduct. 5 With these exceptions, American courts generally
hold that punitive damages are noncompensatory in nature and,
1. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transmerica Ins. Co., - Mont. - 679 P.2d
1217 (1984); Fitzgerald v. Western Fire Ins. Co., - Mont. - , 679 P.2d 790 (1984).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
3. These four states are Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington. See
Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 559 (1949); Boot Mills v. Boston & Me. R.R., 218
Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Wilfong v. Omaha Council Bluffs St. R.R., 129 Neb. 600, 262
N.W. 537 (1935); and Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952).
4. These states are Connecticut, Michigan, and New Hampshire. See Tedesco v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1935); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190
N.W. 746 (1922); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (1876).
5. See Glissman v. Rutt, 175 Ind. App. 493, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (1978). Indiana decisions
were once grounded in the belief that if punitive damages were allowed, then a defendant
may be subject to double jeopardy, which is constitutionally prohibited. See Aldridge, The
Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945).
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therefore, award them in addition to full compensation. Conduct
that will justify an award of punitive damages usually involves ele-
ments such as willfulness, wantonness, oppression, outrageous con-
duct, indignity, insult, fraud, recklessness, or malice.'
The Montana Supreme Court has consistently emphasized
that the primary purpose of assessing punitive damages is to pun-
ish the wrongdoer and through that punishment to deter future
unlawful conduct of the tortfeasor and others: "To perform its of-
fice as a deterrent, punitive damages when awarded should be of
such a significant amount as will serve the office of deterrence by
punishing the defendant and as will warn others. ' '7
In recent years, the Montana Supreme Court has expanded
the availability of punitive damage awards. The court stated that
the malice in law which would support a claim for punitive dam-
ages may be found where a defendant's conduct is "unjustifiable.",
Because of confusion regarding what conduct was "unjustifiable,"
the court recently attempted to come to grips with the problem of
uncertainty in the area of punitive damages. In Owens v. Parker
Drilling Co.,' the court acknowledged the expanded availability of
punitive damage awards based on concepts like gross negligence,
recklessness, and unjustifiability, and adopted the following
standard:
When a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create
a high degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of an-
other, and either deliberately proceeds to act in conscious disre-
gard of or indifference to that risk, or recklessly proceeds in un-
reasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his conduct
meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which
the law of this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on
the basis of presumed malice."
This standard further expanded the types of conduct giving
rise to punitive damage awards, and prompted litigation concern-
ing whether insurance liability policies covered punitive damage
6. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 249 (1965).
7. Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., __ Mont. __, 682 P.2d 725, 740 (1984). This
same rationale is found in the Montana Code Annotated which states:
In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising from contract where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the
jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983) (emphasis added).
8. First Security Bank v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 423, 593 P.2d 1040, 1049 (1979).
9. - Mont. ., 676 P.2d 162 (1984).
10. Id. at -, 676 P.2d at 164.
[Vol. 46
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awards against the insured in Montana. Although such litigation is
recent in Montana, a somewhat substantial body of law has devel-
oped in other jurisdictions.11
III. THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE COVERAGE THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY
A. Introduction
Although some liability insurance policies expressly cover pu-
nitive damages by defining "loss" to include punitive damages,
most policies are unclear as to coverage. Most policies neither spe-
cifically include nor exclude coverage. A typical liability insurance
policy obligates the insurer to pay all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily in-
jury or property damage.12 In addressing whether such policies
cover punitive damages, courts analyze the issue on two grounds:
1) whether the contract language includes punitive damages cover-
age; and 2) if there is coverage, whether the coverage is against
public policy. 3
B. Holdings Based Upon Insurance Contract Interpretation
In determining whether the liability insurance contract lan-
guage covers punitive damages, courts often look to the contract in
issue. In doing so, courts usually rule on the basis of the ambiguity
of the contract language or the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties. An analysis of the decisions indicates that the same argu-
11. Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 11 (1982).
12. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.02 (1984).
13. A third ground courts often consider is whether the principles of vicarious liability
permit coverage. Nearly all of the state courts which have considered this question have
held in favor of allowing coverage. Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 11 (1982). These courts reason that
since vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is imposed even if the
employer is not at fault, public policy is best served by allowing coverage. Punishing an
innocent employer is pointless. Consequently, the innocent employer should not be subject
to liability for punitive damages and should be allowed to insure against such liability as-
sessed vicariously. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 470 F. Supp.
92 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
In Norfolk, an employee of the insured had been in an automobile accident which re-
sulted in a punitive damages award against the employer. The employer paid the punitive
damages and brought an action against its insurance carrier to recover the amount. The
court recognized that punitive damages are to deter an insured's wrongful conduct and that
an insured should not avoid the penalty by means of insurance. However, it noted a distinc-
tion between liability for punitive damages directly imposed and such liability when vicari-
ously imposed. Accordingly, it granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer-insured. Id.
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ments produce different results in different jurisdictions.
Courts holding that punitive damages are not covered usually
reason that the contract is not ambiguous and that punitive dam-
ages are not damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage."1 '
The most recent decision based on such reasoning is Schnuck Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance Co.15 There, the court inter-
preted a policy containing language that the "company will pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le-
gally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or prop-
erty damage. . . ." The court held that punitive damages were not
in the category of damages for "bodily injury" or "personal injury"
but rather for punishment when the actor's conduct displays the
requisite malice. 6 Thus, the insurance company was not required
to cover the punitive damages assessed against the insured.
On the other hand, the majority of courts stress the phrase
"all sums." Ignoring the phrases "bodily injury" or "property dam-
age," they hold that "all sums" includes coverage for punitive
damages.1 7 The Oregon court in Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.,18 succinctly stated the majority's position in favor of coverage:
"the policy unambiguously covers 'all sums.' Punitive damages are
a form of damages; when liquidated by a judgment, they are a
14. Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Fla. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 423 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1970); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D.
Conn. 1965); Brown v. W. Casualty & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Braley
v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359 (Me. 1982); Casperson v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93,
213 N.W.2d 327 (1973); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Knight, 34 N.C. App. 96, 237 S.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 589, 239 S.E.2d 263
(1977).
15. 652 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. App. 1983).
16. Id. at 209, 210 (citing Cavin's, Inc. v. Allstate Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 701,
220 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1975)). There, the court stated:
Punitive damages are never awarded merely because of a personal injury inflicted
nor are they measured by the extent of the injury; they are awarded because of
the outrageous nature of the wrongdoer's conduct. Being awarded solely as pun-
ishment to be inflicted on the wrongdoer and as a deterrent to prevent others
from engaging in similar wrongful conduct, punitive damages can in no proper
sense be considered as being awarded "only with respect to personal injury" or as
damages which are payable "because of personal injury." Compensatory damages,
which are awarded to compensate and make whole the injured party and which
are therefore to be measured by the extent of the injury, are the only damages
which are payable "because of personal injury."
Cavin's, 27 N.C. App. at 701, 220 S.E.2d at 406.
17. Norfolk, 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Skyline Harvestore Systems, Inc. v.
Centennial Ins. Co., - Iowa __, 331 N.W.2d 106 (1983); Harrell v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313, 404 A.2d
101 (1979); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1982).
18. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
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Other courts have allowed coverage on the theory that the pol-
icy language is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in
favor of the insured. These courts usually note that the insurance
company could have removed the ambiguity easily by specifically
excluding punitive damages from coverage.20 Still others rely on
the argument that the contract was ambiguous and that the in-
sured expected coverage to include punitive damages.21 The court
in Harrell pointed out that business and professional persons con-
stantly face the perils of punitive damages in their daily operations
and stated that "a person insured by such a policy would have rea-
son to suppose that he would be protected against liability for 'all
sums' which the insured might become 'legally obligated to
pay.' "22
C. Holdings Based Upon Public Policy
The second major issue courts address when determining
whether insurance policies cover punitive damages is public policy.
Two landmark cases which reached opposite conclusions on the
public policy issue are Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. Mc-
Nulty ' and Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. 24
In McNulty, the court held that public policy prohibited a lia-
bility insurer from paying punitive damages awarded against its in-
sured.25 There, the intoxicated insured hit a car while driving at
excessive speeds. The court reasoned that since punitive damages
are awarded for punishment and deterrence, punitive damages
would serve no useful purpose if a negligent insured were allowed
to shift the punitive damages burden to an insurance company.26
Furthermore, the court reasoned:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establish-
ment of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that
19. Id. at 203, 567 P.2d at 1014 (citing Norfolk, 420 F. Supp. at 94 n.1).
20. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Okla.
1981); Harrell, 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013; Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d
908 (1965).
21. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Regent Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978); Glens
Falls, 137 Vt. 313, 404 A.2d 101; Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91,
267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
22. Harrell, 279 Or. at 204-05, 567 P.2d at 1015.
23. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
25. 307 F.2d at 434-35.
26. Id. at 440.
1985]
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insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as vio-
lative of public policy. The same public policy should invalidate
any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that puni-
tive damages represent . . . . And there is no point in punishing
the insurance company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of
course, and considering the extent to which the public is insured,
the burden would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance
companies but on the public, since the added liability to the in-
surance companies would be passed along to the premium payers.
Society would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed
by the insured.2 7
Concluding, the court stated that there were especially strong
public policy reasons not to allow irresponsible drivers guilty of
reckless slaughter or maiming on the highway to escape punish-
ment by shifting liability for punitive damages to their insurers. 8
Within seven years after McNulty, courts in New Jersey,29 Mis-
souri,30 Kansas,31 Pennsylvania,32 and New York,3 3 reached similar
conclusions.
In contrast to McNulty, Lazenby is the leading case allowing
coverage for punitive damages based upon public policy grounds.
As in McNulty, the insured in Lazenby became intoxicated, was
involved in an automobile accident, and brought suit against his
insurer to cover a punitive damages award. The court quoted from
McNulty extensively, but reached the opposite result for three
reasons.
First, the court stated its opinion that making an insured pay
punitive damages would not deter the insured's wrongful conduct.
The court reasoned that since criminal sanctions appeared to have
little effect in deterring slaughter on the highways, placing liability
on the insured would have no greater effect.34 The court concluded:
"Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in the payment
of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty drivers would in our
opinion contain some element of speculation."35
Second, the court expressed its opinion that the average policy
holder expects to be protected against all claims not intentionally
27. Id. at 440-41.
28. Id.
29. LoRocco v. N.J. Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591, cert.
denied, 42 N.J. 144, 199 A.2d 655 (1964).
30. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
31. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
32. Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
33. Tuska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969).
34. Lazenby, 214 Tenn. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
35. Id.
[Vol. 46
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inflicted.30 Finally, the court stated that the line of demarcation
between actions supporting punitive damages and those not sup-
porting such damages was too fine to allow coverage in some in-
stances and not in others.3 7 This reason became a major factor in
cases following Lazenby.
For example, in Harrell, the court acknowledged the fine line
between cases giving rise to punitive damages and cases that do
not. It feared that holding coverage for punitive damages to be
against public policy would have far-reaching consequences in the
business and professional communities. The court noted that a re-
tail store owner who falsely arrests an individual, a doctor liable on
a medical malpractice claim, and a creditor found to have wrong-
fully repossessed secured property could all find themselves sub-
ject to punitive damage awards with no insurance coverage. 8 If
such situations were excluded from coverage, the court considered
the policy to be virtually worthless. Accordingly, it held that liabil-
ity insurance covered punitive damage awards and that such cover-
age was not against public policy. 9
Since Lazenby, debate continues whether coverage for puni-
tive damages violates public policy. The debate usually concerns
whether an insured is deterred or punished if the insurance com-
pany covers the punitive damages award. In Price v. Hartford Ac-
cident and Indemnity Co.,' 0 the Arizona Supreme Court held that
coverage did not violate public policy.' 1 The court refused to follow
the McNulty court's reasoning and recognized a number of effec-
tive punishments and deterrents to misconduct besides the imposi-
tion of punitive damages: 1) even though a person is insured for
punitive damages, the insured cannot engage in wanton conduct
without punishment because he may be liable for criminal penal-
ties; 2) any act subjecting the insured to punitive damages will
cause his insurance rates to soar; 3) most persons do not carry mul-
timillion dollar liability policies and the possibility that punitive
damages will exceed their policy limits will exercise a deterrent ef-
fect on them; and 4) there is no evidence that those states which
deny coverage have accomplished any appreciable effect on the
conduct of insureds.' 2
Following Price, at least six previously uncommitted jurisdic-
36. Id. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
37. Id.
38. Harrell, 279 Or. at 210-11, 567 P.2d at 1018.
39. Id. at 218, 567 P.2d at 1021.
40. 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
41. Id. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524.
42. Id.
1985]
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tions rejected McNulty and imposed the insured's liability for pu-
nitive damages on the insurers. These jurisdictions include Geor-
gia,'3 Idaho," Oregon,"5 Texas,'6 Virginia,' and Montana. 8
IV. DECISIONS IN MONTANA
A. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Insurance Co.
In April, 1983, the Montana Supreme Court decided both the
public policy issue and contract interpretation issue and held in
favor of coverage.' 9 The court has not addressed whether the prin-
ciples of vicarious liability permit coverage."
In First Bank the court found that providing insurance cover-
age for punitive damages was not contrary to public policy in Mon-
tana. 1 This action arose after the insured had been named a de-
fendant in three wrongful repossession cases. The insurer
undertook the defense of its insured, but specifically denied any
43. Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 233 S.E.2d 910
(1977).
44. Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,
511 P.2d 783 (1973).
45. Harrell, 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013.
46. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
47. Lipscomb v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 180 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
48. First Bank, - Mont. __ , 679 P.2d 1217.
49. Id. at - , 679 P.2d at 1223; Fitzgerald, - Mont. __ , 679 P.2d at 792.
50. The Montana Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of vicarious liability for
punitive damage awards. However, it has used reasoning similar to that used by courts to
allow coverage for vicarious acts in White v. State, - Mont.-_, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983). In
White, the court upheld the constitutionality of a Montana statute creating immunity from
punitive damages assessed against governmental entities. Id. at __ , 661 P.2d at 1276. The
reasoning the court used in determining governmental immunity parallels the reasoning
courts use to allow coverage for vicarious acts. See supra note 13. First, the court recognized
that punitive damages are to punish and deter. It then reasoned: 1) an award of punitive
damages against a municipality punished only the taxpayers, who took no part in the com-
mission of the tort; 2) punishing the innocent taxpayers is pointless; and 3) governmental
entities, consequently, should not be subject to punitive damages liability. White, at -,
661 P.2d at 1276.
White involves the liability of a governmental entity which makes it distinguishable
from situations involving other sorts of defendants. However, if the reasoning of White is
followed, it is likely that the Montana Supreme Court will hold that coverage for punitive
damages is permissible where an employer has been held liable for punitive damages solely
due to the conduct of another under principles of vicarious liability: 1) an award of punitive
damages against an employer punishes only the employer, who took no part in the commis-
sion of the tort; 2) punishing the innocent employer is pointless; and 3) consequently, em-
ployers should not be subject to punitive damages assessed vicariously. The holdings of
First Bank and Fitzgerald buttress this conclusion since they seem to indicate that the
court favors coverage.
51. First Bank, __ Mont. -, 679 P.2d at 1223.
8
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coverage for punitive damages under its liability insurance con-
tract. Consequently, the insured filed suit against its insurance
company in the United States District Court for the District of
Montana to determine coverage. The United States District Court
certified two questions to the Montana Supreme Court:
(1) Does the public policy of Montana permit insurance cov-
erage of punitive damages?
(2) If the public policy of Montana does not generally permit
insurance coverage of punitive damages, would it nevertheless
permit coverage for punitive damages for which a banking corpo-
ration is or could be held liable by reason of the acts of its
employees?5
Since the Montana Supreme Court held that the public policy of
Montana permits insurance coverage, 53 it did not address the sec-
ond question. In its decision, the court first acknowledged that the
major aims of awarding punitive damages are punishment and de-
terrence. However, it refused to follow McNulty. The court ex-
pressed its belief that the deterrent effect of punitive damages was
minimal, and cited with approval the Lazenby court's discussion
concerning the failure of civil and criminal sanctions to deter
wrongful conduct on the highways.
Next, the court expressed a concern that an insured's contract
will become virtually worthless if it does not cover punitive dam-
ages since punitive damages awards are often large and actual
damages small. The court premised its discussion on the assump-
tion that many insurance agreements include coverage for torts.
Such torts may include false arrest, malicious prosecution, wrong-
ful entry or eviction, libel and slander, racial or religious discrimi-
nation, and wrongful repossession. Since many verdicts resulting
from such torts include minimal actual damages but substantial
punitive damages,54 the court reasoned that an insured's contract
would become worthless if punitive damage coverage were
disallowed.55
Finally, citing Harrell, the court pointed out that punishment
in the context of punitive damages may come as a wholly unantici-
pated aspect of one's conduct because of the fine line between ac-
52. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 1218.
53. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 1223.
54. A case illustrating the kind of exposure for punitive damages in commercial torts
is Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977).
There, a widow brought an action against a cemetery for the wrongful removal of a grave
marker. The actual damages in such a case are minimal; the exposure is in punitive
damages.
55. First Bank, __ Mont. - , 679 P.2d at 1221.
1985]
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tions supporting and not supporting punitive damages. The court
acknowledged that fact-finders wrestle with concepts like reckless-
ness and reasonableness. Insureds may not know their conduct
subjected them to punitive damages until after a trial. Conse-
quently, the court declined to define limits of insurance coverage
for punitive damages but seemed to narrow its holding by stating:
"[T]he law is still in such a state of flux as to warrant caution on
the issue of whether public policy prohibits coverage of punitive
damages in all cases. "5 6
The court left the decisions of whether coverage would be per-
mitted to the insurance carriers and their customers until the law
of punitive damages was more certain or until the legislature al-
tered the law of punitive damages or expressly declared a policy
against coverage in all cases. The court concluded:
The problems posed by insurance coverage of punitive damages
are unquestionably like those inherent in the Gordian Knot. Un-
like Alexander the Great, however, we cannot make a clean slice
through our version of the Knot, in order to unravel all the as-
pects of the question before us, without working an injustice to
many policy holders. Alexander dealt only with an inanimate ob-
ject; we deal with people. Use of the judicial sword therefore is
inappropriate in this case. Here, we must "untie" the knot, pains-
taking as the process may be.57
B. Fitzgerald v. Western Fire Insurance Co.
Three days after the decision in First Bank, the Montana Su-
preme Court addressed the contract interpretation issue and again
held in favor of coverage. 8 The language of the policy at issue in
Fitzgerald read: "The Western Fire Insurance Company ...
[a]grees . . . [t]o pay on behalf of the insured, all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of: a. bodily injury; b. property damage; arising out of the owner-
56. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 1222 (emphasis added).
57. First Bank, __ Mont. - , 679 P.2d at 1223. According to an early dictionary:
The Gordian Knot in antiquity, [was] a knot in the leather or harness of Gordius,
a king of Phrygia, so very intricate that there was no finding where it began or
ended. An oracle declared that he who should untie this knot should be master of
Asia. Alexander, fearing that his inability to untie it should prove an ill augury,
cut it asunder with his sword. Hence, in modern language, a Gordian knot is an
inextricable difficulty; and to cut the Gordian knot, is to remove a difficulty by
bold or unusual measures.
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1904).
58. Fitzgerald, - Mont. -, 679 P.2d 792.
[Vol. 46
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ship, maintenance or use of the automobile. 59
In Fitzgerald, the insured became involved in an automobile
accident while driving his car at a high rate of speed after consum-
ing a large quantity of alcohol."0 A jury found the insured guilty of
negligent driving and assessed a $5,000 punitive damages award.
The court held that the language of the insurance contract pro-
vided coverage for punitive damages." Quoting extensively from
Harrell, the court based its opinion on three reasons: 1) where an
ambiguity in an insurance contract exists, every doubt is to be re-
solved against the insurer;6" 2) a person insured by such a policy
would have reason to suppose that he would be protected against
liability for punitive damages; 3 and 3) the insurance company
could have removed the contract ambiguity by including an ex-
press exclusion from liability for punitive damages but chose not to
do so.64 The court refused to discuss whether public policy ex-
cluded coverage in the case as it considered First Bank controlling.
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF First Bank AND Fitzgerald
A. Analysis
In First Bank the court based its decision on its previous dis-
cussions of deterrence and punishment. The court reasoned that
since many kinds of conduct are never successfully deterred by pu-
nitive damage awards, punishment was left as the only effective
realizable goal. Since it is uncertain what conduct gives rise to pu-
nitive damages in Montana, the court reasoned that one should not
be punished for conduct not considered or known to be wrongful.
Thus, the court expressed its "caution on the issue of whether pub-
59. Id. at __, 679 P.2d at 791.
60. Id.
61. Id. at -, 679 P.2d at 792.
62. Id.
63. Id. Fitzgerald is not the only recent Montana case in which the Montana Supreme
Court relied on the reasonable expectations of an insurance contract purchaser. In Tran-
samerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, - Mont. - , 656 P.2d 820 (1983), the court stated: "The
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though pain'staking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations." - Mont. -, 656 P.2d at 824 (quot-
ing Keeton, Insurance Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967
(1970). In response to such statements, one court has stated: "We believe that a person has
no right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reckless and wanton
actions on someone else." Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 53, 54
(Fla. 1965).
64. Fitzgerald, - Mont. -, 679 P.2d at 792.
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lic policy prohibits coverage of punitive damages in all cases." 5
The court's reasoning seemed to hint that there were in fact
cases where it would be proper to prohibit coverage, but that First
Bank was not such a case. It implied that one whose conduct was
certain to give rise to punitive damages and known to be wrongful
should not be permitted to hide behind the shield of his insurer.
The person whose conduct invariably results in punitive damages
should be punished by being required to pay such damages.
The drunk driving case would appear to be just such a case.
Counsel for a plaintiff in a drunk driving case commonly pleads
two counts. The first count requests compensatory damages arising
out of the negligence of the defendant. The second count pleads
"recklessness or gross negligence" and requests punitive damages.
The drunk driver's conduct is certain to give rise to punitive dam-
ages and known to be wrongful. However, the court in Fitzgerald
dispelled any flicker of hope the insurance industry might have
had that the Montana Supreme Court would indeed attempt to
find fact situations in which it would be proper to prohibit cover-
age and, thus, "untie the knot, painstaking as the process may
be." 6
6
In Fitzgerald, the court appeared to settle the issue by favor-
ing coverage in all cases. There, the insurance company attempted
to argue that the court should exercise caution and not allow cov-
erage for punitive damages in all cases. However, the court made
little of the argument that public policy would be violated if a
drunk driver was able to shift the burden of his negligence to the
insurance company by stating: "Because [First Bank] deals in de-
tail with the [public policy] issues raised by appellant [Western
Fire] we need not make any further comment. '67
The problems inherent in insurance coverage for punitive
damages are indeed, like the Gordian Knot, difficult to unravel. In
First Bank and Fitzgerald, the Montana Supreme Court at-
tempted to solve the problems by favoring coverage in all circum-
stances. Its holdings raise additional difficult issues which will im-
pact Montana. These issues include the rationale behind punitive
damages in Montana, the introduction into evidence of insurance
coverage, further possibilities of fraudulent claims, and the re-
sponse of the insurance industry.
65. First Bank, - Mont. , 679 P.2d at 1222 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Fitzgerald, - Mont. , 679 P.2d at 792.
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B. Impact
1. Blow to the Theory Behind Punitive Damages
The holdings of First Bank and Fitzgerald dealt a death blow
to the theory behind punitive damages in Montana. The Montana
Supreme Court has long held that the purposes of punitive dam-
ages are punishment and deterrence. 8 Yet, in First Bank, the
court announced that many kinds of conduct are never successfully
deterred.
The court failed to realize that the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is not only to deter the wrongdoer but to deter others. Recent
studies show that strong sanctions against drunk drivers may have
a deterrent effect on alcohol-related deaths and accidents on the
highways. 9 Criminal charges, convictions, and fines may not be a
complete answer. These sanctions may be some reparation to soci-
ety, but they may not have maximum deterrent effect on others.
Therefore, punitive damages are necessary to provide all possible
means of deterring drunk driving. The drunk driver should not be
allowed to transfer his punitive damage responsibility. As the Ore-
gon Supreme Court stated:
It may be debatable whether either awards of punitive damages
or the imposition of criminal penalties will effectively deter per-
sons from driving after drinking. However, in the absence of a
showing of substantial evidence to the contrary, we are not pre-
pared to hold that law enforcement officials and courts, who have
a heavy responsibility in this area, are wrong in their present ap-
parent assumption that both criminal penalties and awards of pu-
nitive damages may have at least some deterrent effect in dealing
with this serious problem.70
The rebuttal to this argument is: 1) that a judgment for puni-
tive damages will deter reckless driving even if the insurance com-
pany covers punitive damages since increased insurance rates will
punish and deter the offending driver; and 2) that the possibility of
liability in excess of policy limits will adequately deter.71 Such de-
terrence is far less than it would otherwise be if punitive damages
could not be covered by insurance. Maximum deterrence should be
68. White v. State, - Mont. ., 661 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1983). See also Ramsbacker
v. Hohman, 80 Mont. 480, 261 P. 273 (1927).
69. See Ross, Prevention and Deterrence, ALCOHOL HEALTH AND RESEARCH WORLD 26
(Fall 1982).
70. Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 190-91, 508 P.2d 211, 215 (1973).
71. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
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the goal.72 The fact that the drunk driver causes many serious acci-
dents is strong evidence supporting the need for all possible means
of deterring drunk driving. Exposing the insured to punitive dam-
age awards is one such means.
The court in First Bank raises further doubts as to the theory
behind punitive damages when it concludes that since some indi-
viduals may be willing to pay higher premiums for coverage of pu-
nitive damages, insurance carriers may be convinced to extend cov-
erage in some situations.73 Allowing purchase of protection for
punitive damages punishes no one. If punitive damages do not de-
ter, and can be insured against, the rationale to support the impo-
sition of them disappears. 4
2. Allowing the Introduction of Insurance Coverage into
Evidence
In First Bank the court considered punishment as "perhaps
the only effectively realizable goal of awarding punitive dam-
ages. '75 This goal raises questions regarding proof of wealth and
allowing the introduction of insurance coverage into evidence.
The Montana Supreme Court and virtually every other juris-
diction recognize that the jury may consider the defendant's
72. See Harrell, 279 Or. 199, 219, 567 P.2d 1013, 1022 (Holman, J., dissenting).
73. First Bank, - Mont. - , 679 P.2d at 1222.
74. Such reasoning prompted the Oregon Supreme Court to offer other alternatives:
There may be other alternatives that would be preferable to the present state
of the law in Oregon on the subject of punitive damages, such as:
(1) The complete elimination of punitive damages;
(2) Some limitation upon the amount of awards for punitive damages;
(3) A limitation of liability for punitive damages to flagrant misconduct, such
as intentionally inflicted injury.
Harrell, 279 Or. at 216, 567 P.2d at 1021. Worth noting is the fact that Montana Legislators
introduced at least three bills before the 49th legislature limiting the amount of awards for
punitive damages by amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983). See S.B. 200, 49th Leg.
(1985); H.B. 363, 49th Leg. (1985); H.B. 511, 49th Leg. (1985).
A unique alternative calls for holding punitive damages insurable and changing the In-
ternal Revenue Code:
(1) Amend section 61 to clearly include in the income of the taxpayer all amounts
paid to or on behalf of the taxpayer by an insurer unless otherwise excluded by
another provision.
(2) Add to the language of section 162(f) a further clause providing that a deduc-
tion be allowed for all amounts characterized by the awarding court or the settle-
ment agreement of the parties as "punitive damages."
(3) Add a new exclusion for all amounts paid to or on behalf of a taxpayer as
compensatory damage regardless of whether such damage would have been de-
ductible under existing law had it been paid directly by the taxpayer.
King, The Insurability of Punitive Damages: A New Solution to an Old Dilemma, 16 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 345, 374 (1980).
75. First Bank, __ Mont. -, 679 P.2d at 1221.
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wealth in fixing the amount of punitive damages .7  The purpose of
admitting evidence of a defendant's net worth is to apprise the
jury of the information needed to assess an award which will ade-
quately punish the defendant."7 On the other hand, the Montana
Supreme Court also holds that evidence of liability insurance is
generally not admissible and that injection of such evidence, di-
rectly, indirectly, by evidence, argument, or remarks, constitutes
reversible error.78
Since the court considers punishment as the only effectively
realizable goal of awarding punitive damages, it logically follows
that the court should include the amount of the insurance policy as
an asset of the insured and allow it to be introduced into evidence.
The jury would then have the information necessary to adequately
assess a punitive damage award which would have the effect of
punishment. Consequently, although the introduction of insurance
into evidence is contrary to present Montana law, it may be neces-
sary to allow such evidence to maintain the rationale behind puni-
tive damage awards.7 9
3. The Possibility of Fraudulent Claims
Another implication arising out of the First Bank and Fitzger-
ald cases is the further possibility of fraudulent claims. In the re-
cent case of Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royles° the court held
that a parent is not immune from suit brought by his unemanci-
76. Gibson, - Mont. ., 682 P.2d at 740.
77. Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 334 N.E.2d 79 (1975).
78. Sioux v. Powell, - Mont. __, 647 P.2d 861 (1982); D'Hooge v. McCann, 151
Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747 (1968). The policy reason for not allowing the introduction of insur-
ance into evidence is to avoid prejudicing the jury. Avery v. City of Anaconda, 149 Mont.
495, 499, 428 P.2d 465, 467 (1967).
79. This problem results from the court's holdings in First Bank and Fitzgerald that
liability insurance covers punitive damages awards. First Bank, - Mont. ., 679 P.2d
at 1223. Fitzgerald, - Mont. -, 679 P.2d at 792. Other courts when faced with this
problem have held firmly to their jurisdiction's rules of not allowing the introduction of
insurance into evidence but support their reasoning with weak arguments. For example, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated:
The plaintiff urges that unless he is allowed to comment on the defendant's
insurance coverage, the defendant will be able to mislead the jury with evidence of
his impecuniosity when, in fact, he does have "assets" that will pay for punitive
damages. We reject the plaintiffs assertion that the insurance policy is an asset of
the defendant, which the plaintiff can introduce into evidence. The defendant
does not have at his disposal the dollars that the policy represents. Instead, he
merely owns a piece of paper that evidences an insurer's promise to pay any puni-
tive damages that result from an assessment of his own financial position.
Michael v. Cole, 122 Ariz. 450, 452, 595 P.2d 995, 997 (1979). See also Odoms v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976).
80. __ Mont. - , 656 P.2d 820 (1983).
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pated child in cases involving parental negligence in the operation
of a motor vehicle.81 Such negligence subjects the parents to an
award of punitive damages. Under Montana's Mandatory Liability
Protection statutes,81 every owner of a motor vehicle shall "contin-
uously provide insurance against loss resulting from liability im-
posed by law for bodily injury. . . or damage to property ....""
Since First Bank and Fitzgerald conclude that the language of
such an automobile liability policy covers awards for punitive dam-
ages, an unemancipated child could theoretically recovei punitive
damages from his parents.8 4 Transamerica coupled with First
Bank and Fitzgerald provides unscrupulous families with ample
incentive to recover unjustified awards from insurance companies
by bringing fraudulent claims.8 5
4. The Insurance Industry is Unlikely to Respond
The Montana Supreme Court has left it up to the insurance
industry to take action if it does not wish to cover punitive dam-
ages. The court acknowledged that a likely response of the insur-
ance carriers to the holding of First Bank would be to draft spe-
cific exclusions of coverage of punitive damages. Over twenty years
have passed since the court in Lazenby held in favor of coverage
for punitive damage awards. Yet, today the insurance industry in
general has not promulgated policy provisions excluding punitive
damages coverage.
Requiring the insurance industry to change its policies would
no doubt cause a complete change in premium structures. This
would be a large burden on the industry. However, considering the
lack of unanimity among the states on the coverage issue, one won-
81. Id. at __, 656 P.2d at 824. The court's holding in Transamerica is limited to the
negligent operation of a car.
82. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-301 to -304 (1983).
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-301 (1983).
84. In Montana at least $25,000 would be available for punitive damages awards under
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-301(1) (1983) and § 61-6-102 (1983).
85. The Kansas Supreme Court has professed an ability of the judicial process to dis-
cover fraudulent claims in Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768-69, 611 P.2d 135,
142 (1980):
[T]he possibility of collusion exists to a certain extent in any case. Every day we
depend on juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine the facts
and arrive at proper verdicts. Experience has shown that the courts are quite ade-
quate for this task. In litigation between parent and child, judges and juries would
naturally be mindful of the relationship and would be even more on the alert for
improper conduct. We further must recognize that, under provisions ordinarily
included in an insurance policy, the insurance company has the right to disclaim
liability when there is lack of cooperation with the insurance company on the part
of the insured.
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ders how the companies' risk tables can be projected accurately at
the present time. If in fact the companies' premiums have been
based on their assumption that the policies do not cover punitive
damages, then the companies have been sustaining losses since at
least 1923.86 Although it is true that only in recent years have
courts awarded punitive damages in large amounts, the insurance
industry is not going to sit idly by and sustain losses which become
increasingly larger each year as more jurisdictions impute coverage
into their policies. One has to wonder whether premium payers
have not been paying for coverage against punitive damages all
along.
In 1977 the Insurance Service Office [I.S.O.] introduced a pol-
icy endorsement stating: "regardless of any other provisions of this
policy, this policy does not apply to punitive or exemplary dam-
ages."' 87 The insurance industry gave the I.S.O.'s endorsement a
mixed reception and many of I.S.O.'s member companies dis-
sented. Consequently, the I.S.O. announced its withdrawal of the
endorsement in 1978.88 The I.S.O. action seems to have been the
last industry effort to specifically exclude punitive damages. How-
ever, in 1982 the I.S.O. circulated a Commercial General Liability
Policy draft which narrowed the "shall pay all sums" language and
included a detailed definition of damages.8
Although the definition made no specific reference to punitive
damages, the comments accompanying the draft specifically stated
that the definition of damages "is non-restrictive, i.e., it does not
86. See, e.g., Morrell v. Talonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A.2d 435 (1923).
87. GHIARDI & KIRCHER supra note 12, § 7.10 at 28. See Levi, Punitive Damages: Re-
cent Developments, 659 INS. L.J. 719 (1977).
88. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 12, § 7.10 at 28. In March of 1978 when the I.S.O.
announced its withdrawal of the endorsement, thirty-three jurisdictions had approved it,
eight had disapproved it, and the issue was pending in nine jurisdictions. Id.
89. The draft provided:
Coverage A-Definition of Damages
"Damages" include damages for (1) care, loss of services or consortium or death
resulting at any time from bodily injury and, (2) loss of use of tangible property
that has been physically injured.
"Damages" do not include:
(a) fines or penalties;
(b) obligations of an insured under a workers' compensation, disability benefits or
unemployment compensation law, or under a law of like kind;
(c) loss, cost or expense to which the Business Risk Exclusion, as set forth in
Section 12, applies; or
(d) damages because of covered personal injury or covered advertising injury
which the insured is liable to pay solely by reason of the assumption of liability in
a contract or agreement.
Schloerb & Chapin, Punitive Damages: Touring the U.S. for Some Answers, RISK MANAGE-
MENT 34 (December 1982).
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embrace all elements of 'damages' which are payable under the
policy." 90 Thus, whether the draft covered punitive damages ap-
peared to revolve around each state's position on the public policy
issue.
In First Bank, the court left the final decision regarding cover-
age to the insurance industry.91 If the insurance industry wished to
exclude coverage from punitive damages in all cases, the court
urged it to do so expressly in the policy language. If the response
of the insurance industry in the past twenty years is any indica-
tion, industry-wide exclusions of punitive damage awards are un-
likely. Thus, Montanans will see few new exclusions in their liabil-
ity insurance policies and can presume that their premiums cover
them against punitive damage awards.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court indicated its approval of cover-
age for punitive damages in liability insurance policies on both
public policy and contractual grounds. The court relied on the ex-
pectation of the insured and urged the insurance industry to use
policy language expressly excluding punitive damages. The court
expressed its opinion that punitive damages only minimally deter
wrongful conduct. As a result, it cast serious doubt upon the the-
ory behind punitive damages in Montana. Individual Montanans
can rest assured that their liability insurance policies cover them
against punitive damage awards. However, litigation concerning
fraudulent claims and the introduction of insurance coverage into
evidence can be anticipated.
90. Id.
91. First Bank, - Mont..., 679 P.2d at 1223.
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